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ABSTRACT 
The paper covers a familiar subject-the basic value of the market system 
and the major defects of markets such as their instability and inequality. 
Peter Self contends that planners have contributed to the stabilisation of 
urban systems, but have often added to the inequalities of the market system 
rather than reducing them. 
Self examines the basic criteria of welfare economics and argues thal there 
is no necessary disrepancy between economic and social goals. The ultimate 
economic goal is to maximise the sum of individual welfare and this goal 
logically includes unpriced, as well as priced, aspects of individual welfare. 
Planners' possible contributions to the creation of a 'liveable city' and a 
better 'quality of life' are shown to be substantial but have still to be realised 
in Australia. He then deals with the apparent conflict between 'efficiency' 
and 'equity', arguing that more equality in the distribution of welfare (of all 
kinds) would in fact tend to maximise the sum total of welfare. The reasons 
why many economists shy off this conclusion are discussed. 
The way in which market inequalities are, in fact, augmented by the 
economic structure of the big, modern city is analysed. Self argues that an 
effective and just planning strategy requires a combination of substantive 
goals (which benefit society generally) and egalitarian goals (which 
discriminate in favour of poor and disadvantaged groups.) The author then 
applies this general approach to the metropolitan strategies recently 
prepared for four large Australian cities. He reviews urban consolidation 
policy, centres' policy, environmental policy, and State development 
policies from this standpoint. 
In the paper's concluding sections, the author deals briefly with the scope of 
metropolitan planning and its relation to social justice strategies, and with 
some current economic and ideological objections against a wider role for 
planning. He then summarises future directions for planning. 
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METROPOLITAN PLANNING: 
Economic Rationalism and Social Objectivesl 
Peter Self 
Urban Research Program 
Introduction 
It is often claimed or assumed that there is an inevitable conflict between the 
economic and social goals of metropolitan planning. In one obvious sense, 
this is true. If, for example, a basic economic goal is to minimise public 
expenditure, there will be pressure to cut the standard of social services and 
of public amenities such as parks and open spaces. It is a truism that most 
desirable things involve some cost and have to be paid for somehow. 
However, it is or should be the aim of metropolitan planning to achieve 
maximum benefits for the public at the lowest possible cost in real 
resources. Another important goal is to distribute the benefits and costs of 
planning equitably. To think effectively in these terms, one has to set aside 
preconceptions about the respective roles of the public and private sectors, 
and conventional financial measurements of costs and benefits. For 
example, many of the possible benefits of planning do not have a market 
value, but this does not mean that they are less relevant to individual 
welfare than factors which do have a market price. Again, some financial 
costs, such as public acquisistion of land, are transaction costs which do not 
involve any direct consumption of real resources-although their effects 
upon a satisfactory allocation of resources can be significant. Metropolitan 
planning needs to deal with overall benefits and costs, irrespective of 
whether the financing comes from the public or the private sector. 
In principle, as this paper argues, there is no necessary conflict between 
economic and social goals, although limitations of resources do, of cour8e, 
set limits upon what goals can be achieved. The current orthodoxy gives 
priority to 'inarket-led growth', but is is a mistake to assume that the 
market provides an adequate test of economic or social welfare (the two 
1 This is a revised version of a paper delivered to th~ URU-sponsored conf~, 
Metropolitan Planning in Australia 2: Social Costs and BenejiJs, in February 1989. 
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phrases being ultimately identified). It is the purpose of this paper to 
demonstrate the kind of social goals and the extent of government action 
which can be defended, not just on ethical or social grounds, but in terms of 
economic rationalism. 
Economic Rationalism and the Market 
Economic rationalism usually means the efficient transm1ss1on and 
satisfaction of individual preferences. Competitive markets have obvious 
advantages, when contrasted with governments, for achieving this goal. In 
particular they do well (as Gorbachev now realises) over allocative 
efficiency-<:ompare the ease with which a consumer can order her 
preference in a supermarket with her difficulties in conveying her 
preference for public goods through voting and political participation. In 
theory, the doctrine of 'consumer sovereignty' will also ensure productive 
efficiency-but for various reasons this is sometimes more doubtful. 
However, economic markets also have serious limitations and grave 
defects. The limitations arise from the intrinsic nature of an economic 
market. Thus (a) markets are frequently not genuinely competitive; 
(b) markets are not simply spontaneous; their operation both requires, and 
is also much affected by, public laws over property, contract, taxation, 
monopoly, safety, health, etcetera, as well as by social conventions and 
norms which influence market relationships; and, (c) actual market 
situations give differential power and wealth to participants which depend 
not just upon their contribution to consumer 'utilities' but upon their 
existing or inherited assets and resources, their location and consequent 
leverage within the process of production, changing structural conditions 
(for example, the dominant position of international finance capital), et 
cetera. 
On top of their limitations, market systems exhibit certain tendencies whose 
effects will vary with the state of market organisation and productive 
technology, and the character of public laws, regulations and interventions. 
(i) Markets can be (and today are) highly unstable-producing rapid 
shifts of .economic activity, obsolescent capital and, in particular, 
structural unemploY!flent. · 
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(ii) Markets are short-sighted and today are governed by relatively 
limited calculations of financial returns. 
(iii) Markets tend to be highly, and cumulatively, inegalitarian, 
especially in respect of the distribution of capital (Public laws may 
reduce or exacerbate this tendency). 
-(iv) Markets (unless strongly controlled) produce adverse 'spillovers' 
such as air, water and noise pollution and the destruction of other 
common resources. 
A further point concerns the definition of 'individual preferences'. The 
market can satisfy only those preferences which can reasonably be priced, 
packaged, individually allocated and profitably sold. All other preferences 
or wants have to be the subject of collective provision which (despite what 
the public choice theorists say) necessarily involves a different framework 
and standards in the exercise of individual choice and responsibility. 
Briefly, then, the economic rationality of competitive markets constitutes 
one genuine social value (and maximises one form of freedom-
consumer's choice), provided it is set within a strong framework of public 
regulation and collective service provision which satisfies other social 
values (and forms of freedom). Conversely, unregulated or badly regulated 
markets and market dominance over matters of collective choice constitute 
a one-sided perversion of social values. Paradoxically, the virtues of 'free' 
markets are being extolled today at the very time when the need for 
collective regulation and public planning has become (for environmental 
and other reason~) more urgent and important than ever before in the 
world's history. The market as it actually operates (which, of course, is far 
from the neo-classical model taught in universities) has become, in Sir 
Geoffrey Vickers' words 'a dangerously self-exciting system'-not only 
through its own tendencies, but through its ability to distort and blot out 
urgent needs for social cooperation which simply cannot be understood or 
realised through market criteria of wealth maximisation and distribution. 
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Markets and Planning 
The defects of markets offer one important historical explanation for the 
development of town planning, and for the attempts of planners to regulate 
land use patterns so as (a) to protect and enhance the quality or 'amenities' 
of residential areas; (b) to separate incompatible land uses; (c) to improve 
the general circulation patterns; (d) to reduce the public and private costs of 
uncontrolled sprawl or congestion; and, (e) to redevelop blighted areas for 
improved uses. 
These aims have expanded by stages from the local (micro) to the 
metropolitan (macro) area. The planners have modified the instability and 
short-sightedness of economic markets. They have made some contribution 
to the economic provision of infrastructure and (sometimes, but very 
slightly) to improved circulation patterns. They have been concerned 
particularly with local amenities, parks, open spaces and historical 
buildings. Their conceptions of an attractive 'townscape' and of a liveable, 
humanised city have been largely defeated by the developers' pre_ferences 
for tall, ugly buildings and by the force of the road lobby. After 40 years of 
modem planning, the best features of Sydney or Melbourne remain (with a 
few exceptions) those that have been inherited from Victorian days and 
from their natural setting. · 
Planning has not been egalitarian. Such benefits as it has produced have 
gone largely to the better-off. Planning started with the protection and 
enhancement of residential amenities (and the consequent stabilisation of 
local land values), but the benefits have gone mainly to the higher-income 
suburbs. Redevelopment of blighted areas was once seen as the key to 
helping poorer groups. However, rnuch of this redevelopment has in 
practice simply displaced such groups (and sometimes consigned them to 
worse conditions) in the interests of commercial development, new roads 
or high income apartments. · 
From an international perspective, redevelopment policies have varied 
enormously between Sweden (where many poor households have been 
relocated in well-planned satellites), to the USA (where vast Federal 
subsidies have been expended upon expelling the poor and blacks to make 
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way for new offices and high-income apartments). In Australia, the 
Whitlam period saw a few examples of the effective rehabilitation of a poor 
area for its existing residents, notably Woolloomooloo, and the green-ban 
period (now regrettably over) extended some protection to other inner 
areas. The South Australian Housing Trust has a good record of 
comprehensive planning of housing and social facilities for lower-income 
groups, but elsewhere public housing has been on a small scale, less linked 
with planning, and mainly on the cheapest, poorly serviced sites, or else, as 
in Melbourne, faulted by the construction of unpopular, poorly-serviced, 
high-density blocks. Again, there are some exceptions-the efforts of the 
Macarthur Development Board may be one. Today, public housing policies 
are usually more sensitive to social considerations and good design, but they 
are on too small a scale to meet the needs of the increasing numbers who 
cannot afford home ownership. 
So planning has not, as might be expected or hoped for, corrected or 
modified the inequalities of the market system within an urban context. In 
some countries, it has exacerbated these inequalities. We have here 
examples of political failure which match those of market failure. One 
reason for political failure is often short horizons of elected politicians, 
who will not be around to get the praise or blame for the long-term (or 
even medium-term) effects of their decisions. In Australia, this tendency is 
compounded by the frequency and interaction of Federal and State 
elections-a non-stop electoral calendar. On top of this, there is the current 
ideology of market-led growth-which is taken to mean (most stupidly and 
erroneously) that government must adapt its own thinking and time-frame 
to market operations. In such circumstances, it may seem strange that we 
have just seen a new out-pouring of metropolitan strategies. While 
welcome developments, the goals of these strategies are limited and still 
have to secure effective political support. 
Secondly, and very obviously, there is differential political influence. Rich 
residents are much better able than poor ones to protect and improve their 
respective areas. Developers and large or multinational companies can 
exercise much pressure upon governments fearful of losing some possible 
investment to another Australian state Qr foreign country, besides the 
personal collusion or even bribery which can sometimes occur. As many 
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neo-Marxist writers have pointed out, the land and property markets have 
grown greatly in their importance for capital gains, and governments are 
expected to help maintain these investments-including the use of planning 
measures to stabilise and concentrate this highly speculative market. 
This analysis seems to support the familiar thesis that the political system is 
controlled by market forces directly or indirectly (for example, through 
calculations or assumptions about local economic effects). However, I 
accept that there are counter-forces-such as environmental and residential 
and consumer movements-which also exert political influence (Lindblom 
1977), but the composition of these groups is also tilted upwards in an 
economic sense. Trade unions might help to reduce the balance somewhat 
if they again took an interest in planning-though the unions no longer 
effectively represent the poorest groups. 
How about town planners themselves? Here there is a paradox. Town 
planning is one of the few professions which have grown up primarily 
within the public service. Hence, unlike doctors, lawyers or architects, the 
rationale of their very existence has always been closely connected with the 
advocacy of distinctive public policies and goals. As planning has become 
more constrained and restricted, and its horizons have shrunk, planners 
have shown the typical vice of professionals-placing the protection of 
their turf, their income, and their status well before the achievement of 
substantive goals. They have also coined the defence that planning is 
political, so that its techniques rather than its goals are their responsibility, 
but the defence will not really wash-it would not do for doctors, for 
example, and much less will it serve a distinctly public profession. 
Simultaneously, however, planning has become more privatised through 
the growth of consultancies, et cetera~ At all events, the planning profession 
has failed to examine the ways in which the actual techniques of planning 
confirm the inequalities of the urban system. 
Socia.I and Economic Goals 
It is often claimed or assumed that there is a confliCtbetween economic and 
social goals. Whether and how far this is so depends uppn how. the word 
'economic' .is d~fined. If i't refers, for example, to the maximisation of 
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GDP (or of some other financial criterion such as maximisation of private 
investment) there clearly is a conflict. If, however, economic goals are 
concerned with the maximum attainment of individual preferences or 
satisfactions (which is a broader and truer criterion), there need not be 
conflict between economic and social goals, although there will be 
substantial problems of measurement and evaluation. 
There is also (within the economic rubric) an apparent conflict between the 
goals of maximising the sum of individual utilities (often miscalled the 
'efficiency' goal) and the goal of equitable distribution (equity goal). This 
economic issue has its equivalent in the question of the balance to be struck 
between substantive goals (which produce net benefits to society as a whole 
but are discriminately weighted between individuals-some of whom may 
incur losses) and distributive goals (which reallocate welfare in favour of 
poorer and less privileged groups.) Here, we will consider the role of 
planning first in relation to substantive (maximising) goals and then to 
distributive (equity) goals. 
Planning ought to be able to offer substantial overall gains in the sum total 
of individual welfare, although it is, of course, arguable as to how far it 
actually does so. Part of the problem is that for the most part such gains will 
not be reflected in the statistics of GDP or other financial indicators-
indeed, in some cases a welfare gain may show up as a financial loss. 
Examples of such possible welfare gains include: . 
(a) Improving access and journey times to work and social facilities 
without consequent reduction of residential quality. 
(b) Reducing ;lir, water and noise pollution-or preventing such 
pollution increasing. 
( c) Improving (or avoiding deterioration in ) the quality and the safety 
of residential and working environments. 
(d) Avoiding or minimising traffic congestion, and ensuring that 
suitable sites are available at reasonable cost for social and cultural 
purposes. 
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( e) Improving the architectural and social attractiveness and variety of 
city centres. 
Of course, some of these benefits will have financial effects, upon house 
prices or petrol costs, for example, but not in ways that can be easily traced 
to the achievements (or failures) of planning. 
Taken together, these possible contributions of planning represent an 
important part of the quality of life and of the 'liveability' of cities: they are 
far from trivial. That this is so is suggested by a number of social surveys, 
such as a recent British one where citizens were asked to rank the relative 
importance of different aspects of urban life. The list included measurable 
economic factors (such as cost of living, cost of housing, and wage levels), 
the quality of public facilities (such as health and council housing), and 
unpriced factors (such as crime, pollution, racial harmony and 
environmental quality). The results showed Edinburgh, Aberdeen, 
Plymouth and Cardiff voted as the most liveable cities with prosperous 
South-East towns down the list and London 34th of 38 (Rogerson et al., 
1988.). 
Of course, the liveability of cities cannot be attributed more than partially 
to the efforts or failure of planners. A major element seems to be some 
sense of community or solidarity. This is a factor outside any normally used 
economic calculus but it does feature in many versions of social goals 
occuring in the planners' own liturgy. A number of surveys actually 
suggest that peoples' perceptions of quality of life and 'liveability' is 
negatively correlated both with size of <:ity (beyond a certain point) and 
with average income levels. This is good news to all who believe that (again 
past a certain point) money incomes play a diminishing or even negative 
part in the sum of human welfare. This is a quite reasonable conclusion for 
a welfare economist who would accept that individual welfare should not be 
identified with that part of it which is measured in money terms. It should 
be good news to town planners-if they know how to build upon it. 
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Economics and Equity 
W,e next must consider the place of equity in the context of economic and 
social goals and criteria. The apparent conflict between the economic 
criteria of maximisation and redistribution dissolves on inspection. lbis is 
because to add up the sum of individual utilities requires us to recognise that 
individuals get different utilities (in money or any other terms) from the 
same expenditure. Commonsense suggests that a poor man gains greater 
utility (satisfaction) from a steak or better housing than does a .rich man. 
The implicatiqns of this statement are strongly egalitarian, sine~ they . 
suggest that the sum total of welfare will be greater if income 311d other 
forms of welfare are more equally distributed. 
Many economists argue that this conclusion is invalid because. individual 
utilities are 'subjective' and cannot be compared. However, .if they cannot . 
be compared, they cannot be added either so that statistics of GDP, et 
cetera, become meaningless as indicators of human welfare. The 
economists' fallback position is the famous Pareto principle which claims 
that a welfare gain only occurs if some people benefit and nobody loses-
thus avoiding any comparisons of individual welfare. However, since an 
individual's loss is (on this theory) a subjective evaluation, it J:>ec.omes 
almost impossible to compensate individuals adequ~tely for .the adverse 
efects of policy decisions-nor is the effort to do so e:ver in fact attempted. 
Thus, the Pareto principle (logically applied) becomes highly conservative 
and would largely freeze the existing distribution of welfare. It is hard to 
find any acceptable defence for this conclusion and indeed the arguinent has 
a very artificial character since in practice all policy decisions rest upon 
interpersonal comparisons. All decisions are justified by the case for 
helping partieular indiv~duals or groups, and are inevitably (in this sense) 
discriminatory (Self, 1975). 
A stronger, more relevant argument a~ainst the case for redistribution .is 
the role of economic incentives in increasing total wealth and hence 
increasing the ~sources available for helping the poor. This ¥gument has 
more substance, but apart from d1e obvious fact that the increased wealth is 
often not used in this way or used to only a minor extent, the whole case for 
'incentives' has been grossly over-drawn. Sweden, with much higher taxes 
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and welfare expenditure than Australia, can still achieve greater economic 
wealth. It has, in fact, been claimed that countries with high public 
expenditure and welfare provision actually do better on economic growth 
than countries with lower public expenditures (Castles & Dowrick, 1988). 
Even if other factors are relevant here, this conclusion would become 
stronger if economic growth were widened to include •quality of life' 
items. A more equal society is likely to be a happier and more harmonious 
society, with fewer problems of pollution, crime, drugs, et cctcra (and their 
consequent heavy costs) and more contentment with living and working 
conditions, the local environment, et cetera-hence, quite possibly, a 
harder working society as well. More prosaically, a distinguished 
American economist has argued -that the distribution of incomes is far 
steeper than the case for 'incentives' could possibly justify (Okun, 1975}-
and this conclusion still ignores the further question of how far existing 
financial rewards do actually correspond with contributions to the wealth 
and welfare of society. 
The general conclusion must be that the social goal of equity (meaning llere 
a more equal distribution of individual welfare) does not in fact conflict 
with the economic goal of maximising total welfare. Of course, there is still 
the open question of how far the goal of more equality should be pushed-a 
question to which there can be no clear single answer-but that problem 
need not overly concern us under the actual present conditions and trends of 
Australian society.2 · 
Equity and Planning 
Pl:anning's failu~ to achieve equity goals is the more serious because it 
seems to be the case that the structure and economy of modem cities not 
2 I beliCve that it iS actilaily the cipcn-endcd character .of the equity principle which leads 
so many economists to assert-that the 'maximising' goal has a son of scientific or 
profe~si9n~! v;didity_, whereas the messy subject of 'equity' should be left to 
politicians. A filnher extension of this way of thinking is the argument that GDP, etc., 
simply because they can be measured in uniform terms, arc better guides to welfare 
than arc.social indicators .~f the quality of life, which arc necessarily hetcrogenous. 
The technical narrowness and ethical myopia of these arguments would-matter less if it 
were not that many politicians and others arc simple-minded enough to believe the 
economists. 
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only reflects the inequalities of the market but intensifies them. This comes 
about in several ways. 
(a) A prime determinant of an individual's level of welfare is his or her 
house and location within the city. However, access to housing 
(leaving aside the small quantity of rented housing of reasonable 
quality) depends upon the individual's possession of capital and 
credit rating-and capital is distributed much more unequally than 
are incomes. The escalation of house prices in big ~ities such as 
Sydney has greatly augmented this .particular inequality, producing 
an intergenerational problem (save where parents provide capital) 
as well as a rich and poor one. 
(b) Rising land values have become a major source of speculative gains, 
which are distributed even more unequally than incomes (save to the 
extent that trade union funds, et cetera, benefit). This inequality is 
particularly unjust because it bears no relation to the argument for 
incentives. The rise in land values is primarily due not to any 
efforts of landowners, but to the general growth of population and 
land shortages; yet in the main it is privately appropriated. 
(c) A superior location usually brings with it a pleasanter, safer, better-
protected local environment; better local schools as well as health 
and recreational facilities;-and sometimes (not-always) easier access 
to work, shopping, et cetera. The difference in quality of life 
between rich and poor is much greater in a city like Sydney than in, 
say, Goulburn or even Canberra. The well-off executive or upper 
professional can occupy an attractive seaside or harbourside house, 
or alternatively have a luxury apartment and a country ho~. and 
can enjoy fully the city's special facilities such· as the opera, whereas 
the poor individual will probably face a long daily journey to work 
from an often poorly-serviced location. The growth of the city is 
due in no small measure to the locational preferences of nch 
exe.cutives and professionals with which their workers have to 
comply: · · : 
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How can town planning tackle these structural inequalities of the big city? 
Much of the neo-Marxist literature sees planning as essentially a zero-sum 
game, so that a radical policy requires a substantial redistribution of the 
benefits and costs of city life away from the rich in favour of the poor. I do 
not think such a concept is sufficient, because better planning is needed for 
the whole society and should be (particularly in the longer run), a positive-
sum game. Nor, of course, would such a program stand much political 
chance. The only possible political appeal of planning is to demonstrate that 
it is needed for the welfare of society generally (that is, it has substantive 
goals) while also raising differentially the quality of life of'the more 
disadvantaged. 3 
Thus, the way forward for planners lies through a combination of 
substantive and egalitarian goals, but with a much stronger emphasis upon 
the latter. This emphasis is justified by the inequalities of the market system 
as it actually operates in cities, especially big ones. A more equal 
distribution of personal utilities would certainly raise the sum total of 
welfare, which is the economists' ultimate criterion. At the same time, 
planning also has the potential to increase forms of welfare which are 
largely 'unpriced' but which the evidence shows are of rising significance 
to the whole population. These substantive gains in quality of life for all 
also need to be much more equitably distributed. 
Improving Metropolitan Strategies 
How could such goals be achieved? One starting point is to consider how 
far the recent metropolitan strategies for four big Australian cities 
(Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth) match up to these goals and 
where they need -to be improved or extended. (For a summary of the 
strategies, see Self, 1988). 
Orban Consolidation 
Urban consolidation is a '_goal shared by all four strategies. In overall 
'substantive' terms, it is a sound enough goal; given the major changes in 
household structures and housing demands, and given the high and rising 
3 For a political blueprint, see Self, 1982, Chapter 5. 
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costs of urban spread (Newman, 1988). But to be an acceptable policy on 
our chosen criteria, urban consolidation must be of particular benefit to the 
numerous households on low or modest incomes (especially single-parent 
families, pensioners, single individuals, etc) who would prefer to live in 
inner or middle-ring suburbs but at present cannot afford to do so or are 
being squeezed out or displaced. An obvious solution is a big increase in the 
provision of public housing in these areas, a solution that is at present . 
limited (except, perhaps, in Adelaide) by the shortage of housing funds and 
the high cost of land in the chosen areas-as well as local residents' 
opposition in many areas. The high cost of land could.be overcome by a 
scheme of land value taxation, which would apply the proceeds to social 
housing goals .. Such a scheme would be fully practicable and equitable, but 
its political prospects seem to be zero. 
An alternative approach would be for a State Land Commission to realise 
profits on land transactions which were then applied (as deliberate policy) 
to subsidising land costs for 'social housing' in inner and middle ring 
suburbs. The Wran Labor Government in New South Wales played with 
this idea, but the State Land Commission took the view that its function 
was to minimise lot prices on the urban fringe, not to divert funds into the 
higher costs of urban consolidation. If, however, a Land Commission 
operated on a broader scale so as to make substantial profits from land for 
higher-income housing (both in inner and outer areas), the above objection 
would disappear. A . proper urban consolidation policy would also justify 
the retention of rent controls (not their abolition) and an essential increase 
in public·housing funds for inner areas. One way of financing such housing 
would be through levies on permitted office and commerdal developments 
(as is done in a number of overseas countries.) 
Centres Policy 
The aim of concentrating more offices, retailing and social facilities in city 
centres and sub-centres instead of on dispersed sites-is another common 
goal of these planning strategies. Again, the goal makes substantive sense in 
terms of urban structure and circulation patterns; but in this case the goal is · 
also in principle more egalitarian. 
Many car-owners may well prefer some dispersal of activities if parking is 
thereby facilitated. However, all actual or potential public transport users 
clearly prefer concentrated facilities and their personal 'utilities' will 
generally diminish by a great deal more than the car-owners' utilities will 
gain if they have to find their way somehow to a series of dispersed 
locations instead of having the same opportunities within a single centre.4 
Moreover, market forces are such that in Sydney even a successful centres 
policies is expected to concentrate only 30 per cent of employment in all 
centres combined, the CBD included. This market pressure is, of course, 
much influenced by the preferences of top executives as well as-more 
doubtfully-the convenience of car-owners. (The doubts come in because , 
while an isolated location may be easier for parking, it will usually be less 
attractive for lunch-time activities and social contacts.) Thus, the 
egalitarian element in centres policy is actually a very modest corrective to 
present trends. 
In any case, policy has to be made to happen, and this requires not just land-
use regulation but strong public initiatives and investment. All the strategies 
aim in particular at promoting stronger and larger sub-centres, although 
they also stress the need to enhance the 'vitality' of the CBD (where they all 
foresee some absolute, but not relative. increase of employment.) Clearly, 
attractive and diversified city centres and sub-centres are vital elements in 
the goal of a 'liveable city' for all citizens, but they are especially important 
for lower-income and other groups which lack the mobility of the rich. 
These goals have become much compromised from excessive tenderness to 
developers, and from the failure to control or tax motor traffic for its side-
effects on safety, urban amenity and heritage, as well as urban congestion. 
For the CBD, the desirable policy would follow the example of most 
German cities: eliminate car traffic altogether from most of the centre, 
strengthen public transport, vigilantly protect the existing 'heritage'; clamp 
down on tall and ugly new buildings, promote diversified meeting places 
and entertainments. Such policies would, on the evidence, maximise the 
4 Mishan argues effectively that the sum total of welfare will not be maximised if car 
owners are left to exercise their market preferences because the adverse 'externalities' 
upon public transport users, pcdestrains and other car users will mount cummulatively. 
This is an analogue of other situations where urban planning could provide a better 
solution (Mishan, 1969). 
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satisfactions of the majority and also of the tourists. But for suburban sub-
centres, which at present usually lack diversified activities and an attractive 
physical environment, the task is more difficult. It can only be accom-
plished through 'positive' public planning which utilises public land 
acquisition, the provision of public facilities and amenities, as well as lease 
agreements or joint ventures with private investment executed to a 
coordinated design. Without such initiatives, centres policy could not pass 
our suggested criteria. 
Environmental Policy 
It needs little demonstration to show the substantive value of environmental 
controls over pollution, which in principle these metropolitan strategies 
embrace. There can be plenty of argument as to how far such policies 
should be pushed-but little danger in fact that they are being oversold. On 
the contrary, one of the general or 'substantive' weaknesses of these 
strategies is lack of specified or desirable environmental standards and how 
these are to be attained and monitored. However, the egalitarian goal 
requires more attention to the distribution of environmental 'goods' and 
'bads' throughout the metropolitan area, and the remedial steps to be taken 
in this regard. The need is a similar one to that of achieving a more 
equitable development of social facilities. 
Urban Development Policy 
Finally, in this brief review, one important m1ssmg element in the 
metropolitan strategies needs attention. The strategies do not look beyond 
the further quite rapid growth of the big cities. However, they. contain 
some evidence about the rising costs of such growth in terms of 
environmental pollution, water supply problems, transportation costs, and 
development costs on difficult or remote sites. These problems are greatest 
in Sydney, where at the end of the present plan period all potential release 
areas will have started development, and any further growth will involve 
steep sites, high costs, and serious water (and possibly air) pollution 
problems. In the Adelaide case, the social and equity arguments against 
further peripheral growth are strongly emphasised. The Melbourne and 
Perth strategies have little to say on this subject. However, it is clear that in 
all four cases, Adelaide included, even a successful urban consolidation 
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policy will only act as a mild c.orrective to the outward growth of the big 
cities. 
One advantage of a big urban area is the greater variety (and hence also 
stability) of job opportunities; but there comes a point where this asset is 
more than offset by rising costs, environmental problems, social 
deprivations, traffic congestion and problems of access. It can be argued 
that the Whitlam new city initiatives came in some respects rather too soon, 
and that the time is now ripe for State development policies (supported by 
the Federal Government) which can gradually siphon off some of the 
continuing pressures of metropolitan growth to other areas. Such State 
policies should rely neither upon the generalised decentralisation policies 
once in vogue in Australia, nor, save in special cases, upon single new town 
ventures such as the ill-fated and badly executed Bathurst-Orange example. 
Instead, State policies could aim at the gradual but accelerating 
development of a number of country and coastal towns which could benefit 
from some migration of people and jobs from the big cities. Much of this 
work could be carried out in conjunction with participating local councils. 
Basic elements would be investments in local infrastructure, transportation 
links and industrial estates, improvements to the town centre, some public 
housing, and measures to attract private firms and to disperse some public 
employment. Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland each have some 
six or so towns with sufficient economic potential to justify such a policy. 
Where is the equity element in this concept? A distinguishing feature of 
Australia is the almost complete absence of medium-size cities between, 
say, 100,000 and half a million population. (Wollongong and Newcastle 
qualify, but are now almost linked to Sydney, and Canberra is a special 
case.) Indeed, there are remarkably few towns also in the 50-100,000 
population range. Yet, international experience certainly suggests that 
middle-sized cities have the lowest service costs on average and come out 
more favourably in popular estimations than either big cities or very small 
towns. Are Australians really so different or quite so committed to the now 
rather polluted beaches of the big cities? In any event, such a development 
policy would widen. the range of life-style opportunities available to 
Australians, including at least some low-income households at present 
confined to a choice of outer suburban locations. This opportunity would 
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certainly need to be strengthened by the provision of good low-income 
housing in the new centres, which would be helped by lt>wer land and 
development costs. Some gradual 'siphoning-off of growth in the big cities 
could also assist a more equitable approach to urban consolidation-if there 
is the will to take this approach. 
Metropolitan Planning and Social Justice 
If metropolitan planning is to achieve its potential, clearly it must cover 
more than land-use regulation. Such regulation has to be linked with 
positive public initiatives and investments to achieve desired effects. It has 
to be closely linked with public housing, transportation and financial 
policies. Indeed, an inspection of the four strategies shows how likely it is 
that even their modest goals will be vitiated or distorted (in an equity sense) 
by contrary policies under all three heads. There is no need to rehearse 
again the controversy between physical planning and urban management to 
conclude that they are, anyhow in large measure, complementary. 
If a more comprehensive and egalitarian concept of metropolitan planning 
can ever be workable (politically and organisationally), what would be its 
relation to a social justice strategy? The problem with a social justice 
strategy is that it is apt to be treated in the same way as some economists 
treat 'equity' in relation to 'efficiency'-as a little something to be added on 
or taken away when the harder decisions have been made. I have suggested 
that this economic viewpoint is both theoretically and ethically wrong, yet it 
still pervades much of the decision framework. Social justice strategists 
recognise that it is necessary to get their goals and priorities incorporated 
into the decision-making processes of individual agencies if they are to 
make progress. A more comprehensive concept of planning could offer a 
critical lever for such thinking because of its significance for a variety of 
decisions. Moreover, planning intrinsically needs a social rationale and 
could act as a powerful counterpoise to market-dominated beliefs. But can 
planning do this? 
17 
Back to Economics! 
It may be argued that this degree of positive planning for social goals is too 
theoretical. Can such planning be afforded? Does it not require more 
public (as opposed to market-led) initiative, more public land acquisition, 
more public investment, more restrictions on some developers? Yes, it 
certainly does. But does not this contradict the current economic priorities 
for stimulating private investment and restricting public expenditure? 
There are, of course, good reasons for limiting current public expenditure 
to the yield of taxation so as to reduce inflation, and good reasons, too, for 
scrutinising all public expenditure to test its contribution to human welfare. 
However, the desirable level of public expenditure and taxation is another 
issue-it should depend upon the respective contributions of public and 
private expenditure to the sum total of human welfare, a test which has been 
used throughout this paper. 
Public investment is in any case a different matter. In principle, it is just as 
reasonable to borrow funds for public as for private investment if the 
purpose is a good one. (The financial tests and time frames will necessarily 
be somewhat different.) There is no greater burden of net foreign 
indebtedness if the investor is a public rather than a private body. Of 
course, it may still be desirable to raise some part of public investment 
from taxation just as a private company may partly pay for its new 
investment from earnings-but that in both cases is a matter of prudent 
finance. 
The main argument against public investment is its 'crowding out' effect-
the absorption of funds which could be better used for investment in 
manufacturing industry under present conditions. But inspection of the 
actual workings of the unregulated financial markets hardly confirms this 
hypothesis. (There is, of course, a quite different and probably true 
argument that efficient investment in Australian industry requires 
regulated financial markets.) Rather, it is public investment which is 
getting 'crowded out' through policies of controlling public expenditure 
which (amazing to relate) do not distinguish clearly--or sometimes at all- · 
between current and capital expenditure but place all public expenditure in 
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the same ragbag. Consequently, it is public investment, rather than current public expenditure, which gets cut as being much the easier political option. 
It hurts no one immediately. 
Admittedly, the kind of investment required by planning often takes time to 
yield its benefits, but in view of growing urban and environmental problems this longer-term perspective represents a necessary correction to 
the stress on market 'consumerism'. Also, if these emerging problems are 
to be addressed, it is important that public authorities share the profits of 
urban development as well as steering that development more closely. If, 
for example, a public planning authority acts as the major shareholder in a 
comprehensive scheme for developing a new urban centre, it both has the 
opportunity to create a worthwhile centre (which is not just a set of 
commercial buildings) , and also to get some profit to pay for 
environmental quality and variety. Whereas actually today public 
authorities are giving away substantial future profits in order to save 
immediate expenditure. 
The case of land is also special. Land value taxation, besides being in principle equitable, would also help to divert private investment into 
manufacturing industry. Public acquisition of land is a 'transfer' cost 
comparable to company takeovers, but potentially much more productive 
than many takeovers for its linkage with urban planning and development 
strategies, and also for its ability to reduce the dominant role of private property interests in public consultation procedures. 
There is no necessary theoretical conflict between a much stronger and 
more egalitarian system of metropolitan planning and the basic criteria of 
welfare economics. It all depends how far such planning can maximise the 
sum total of individual welfare through satisfying wants that the market 
cannot meet adequately or at all (many of them unpriced) and distributing 
welfare more equally-anyhow up to the point where equality seriously 
affects productivity which seems a long way off. 
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Conclusion: New Directions for Planning 
This paper has tried to show that there is no necessary conflict between 
economic criteria of efficiency and equity on the one hand, and a more 
positive and egalitarian set of planning goals on the other. However, it may 
be reasonably objected that much of the economic discussion has been at a 
theoretical level. It has not dealt adequately with the practical economic 
problems and beliefs which planners encounter. This criticism is true, and 
this concluding section will endeavour to place planning more concretely 
(if nec~sarily briefly) within the current economic and political context. 
Accepting the economic goal of maximising the welfare of all the 
individuals in the society, and accepting also the goal of a more equitable 
distribution of welfare, it becomes necessary for planners to demonstrate 
that they can contribute to these goals effectively. It makes no basic 
difference (in theory) that the 'goods' which planners produce often cannot 
be bought or sold in the market, or priced in other than a notional (and 
arguable) manner. What this situation means is than planners must largely 
respond to preferences articulated through the political system rather than 
through the market, although the influence of market tastes and constraints 
cannot be ignored. 
Two practical and political issues have to be faced. The first is that given 
the high level of government expenditure at over 40 per cent of GNP (in 
Australia), planners have to seek ways of easing the burden on the public 
purse while forwarding their own goals. This requires tough measures 
which are bound to be initially unpopular. For example, few measures 
could do more to reduce traffic congestion and pollution, and to help 
combat the greenhouse effect, than a really stiff tax on motor traffic within 
cities. Or again, a tax on office development in the central areas of big 
cities would help to disperse offices to suburban or new regional locations, 
to reduce transportation costs and congestion, and to make the centre of 
cities more attractive and habitable. 
Such policies are not pie in the sky, but have been effectively applied in a 
number of European countries and are likely to be extended further. The 
funds realised in this way can then be applied to environmental 
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improvements in the city itself and in major sub-centres, and to the 
improvement of public transport. It is important of course that the costs of 
new taxes should be balanced by positive gains, and that the overall 
incidence of losses and gains should be clearly equitable. Given these 
· conditions, it seems probable that most people would welcome the final 
result, as has happened for example in German cities. However, planners 
need to sell a comprehensive package of policies to the public and 
politicians, and not to be afraid of advocating hard decisions. 
Secondly, there is a severe problem of public investment. Because public 
consumption expenditure is so difficult to cut, Treasuries look for 
economies to public investment This is economically irrational, because 
borrowing for necessary public investment should be governed by different 
criteria. The fashionable panacea of enlisting private investment for public 
purpose is often more costly to the public purse than direct methods, and 
makes no difference to Australia's debt burdens-which is anyhow 
primarily a private sector product. 
Worse still, if current financial conditions and planning goals of present 
market criteria of investment are accepted as binding, then any future 
benefits from an investment which are more than 15 years distant will 
hardly figure at all in a profit and loss calculation. (They will be too 
heavily discounted by high interest rates). This means that a private project 
like the Very Fast Train is almost certainly not financially profitable, unless 
(as the promoters now admit) land profits from related developments can 
also be quickly made to help defray the capital cost. 
Does Australia care about its future? If so, long-term investments must be 
made in the present very inefficient transportation system, in the renewal of 
obsolete urban infrastructure, in soil and forestry conservation, and in 
environmental management; and, also, in the interests of equity, in low-
income housing and in health and welfare services. Planners can help 
realise these goals by pressing for regulations and for taxes or incentives 
which reduce the wasteful or harmful use of existing infrastructure and 
environmental resources. They can seek to restructure cities so as to 
advance these goals. However, such actions require and must be linked with 
a substantial volume of long-term investment. 
21 
It may well be that to secure the necessary volume of long-term investment, 
however precisely it is financed, thee will have to be some reversal of 
current policies of deregulation. That is too complex an issue to be 
explored here. The point for planners is that they need actively to argue for 
those investments which will sustain the quality of the environment and 
improve the liveability of cities over a long period. 
The market system is dedicated to the continuous expansion of profitable 
consumer goods which are individually purchased and consumed. Planners 
are concerned with community or collective goods which cannot be 
packaged, marketed and sold, and whose value to individuals can only be 
appraised gradually or in the long run. Unfortunately, political systems are 
as prone as market systems to short-term perspectives, and planners need to 
put forward explicit visions of what might be, and to show how these could 
be realised, if they are to overcome political inertia and the dominant grip 
of market forces. They have on their side a dawning public consciousness 
of the high importance and growing fragility of both the human and the 
natural environment. There is also increasing realisation that the 'public 
estate', and the patterns of social cooperation and trust which help to sustain 
it, is a key element in human welfare. These assets are not enough unless 
planners can also find the right economic and political arguments. 
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